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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO: WHAT
DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
RAFAEL ESTRADA SAMANO*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Article 17 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican
States
Among the fundamental rights listed in Chapter I (Individual Guar-
antees) of the Mexican Federal Constitution,' there is a right established
in Article 17 which states:
No person may administer justice by himself .... Any person has
the right to secure administration of justice from tribunals which shall
be ready to administer it within the terms established in the laws by
issuing their resolutions in a prompt, thorough and impartial manner.
Their service shall be gratuitous, therefore, judicial costs are prohib-
ited. Federal and state laws shall establish the necessary means to
assure the independence of the tribunals and the full execution of
their resolutions .... 2
This important constitutional provision was approved without any dis-
cussion or debate and by unanimous decision of the Constituent Assembly
in Quer~taro, during its Nineteenth Ordinary Session, held on December
21, 1916. 3 It should be noted that it is a fundamental political decision
which is firmly rooted in the right that all men have to enjoy a just
order through the jurisdiction.
When a controversy arises between two or more individual parties with
respect to the meaning of the law, or in connection with what is just
for each of them, only two procedures may be followed to solve such
controversy: either justice is administered through one party's arbitrary
use of force or the parties submit themselves to a public entity, i.e., a
court of law which will adjudicate impartially. There is, of course, an
intermediate institution: the arbitration, which likewise may be used to
solve controversies and requires the will and consent of the parties to
reach a solution outside the public courts of law.
Once the ancient and uncivilized practice of the vindicta privata (private
revenge) has been supplanted by the rule of law, it should be accepted
* Assistant Attorney General of Mexico; formerly, Director Juridico, Xerox Mexicana, S.A.
de C.V., Mexico, D.F.
1. Chapter I of the Mexican Federal Constitution is, in fact, the Mexican bill of rights.
2. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS EsTADos UNIDOS MEaIcANos [CONST.-POLITICAL CONSTrrUTION
OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATEs], art. 17, at 45 (Cajica Edition 1992) (Mex.) (author's translation).
3. See CkMARA DE DnutrADos, XLVI LEGISLATURA DEL CONGRESO DEL UNI6N, 4 DERECIOS DEL
PUEBLO MEXICANO, M9XIco A TRAVtS DE SUS CONSTITUCIONES 74 (1967) (Mex.).
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that submission to the jurisdiction of the courts is an unavoidable principle
for the existence of the constitutional order, as well as for the definition
and adjudication of individual rights. Furthermore, it is a requirement
for the effectiveness of the rule of law.
But likewise-and this should be stressed very strongly-if there is a
right to seek and attain justice, it follows that there is also a right of
access to the judicial system which declares it, because those entities
charged with the function of the administration of justice should not act
by grace, but by duty.4
B. Actual Situation of the Administration of Justice
Notwithstanding the high principles and the noble purposes underlying
Article 17 of the Mexican Constitution, it is widely acknowledged that
in reality the administration and procuration of justice in Mexico, as
well as the respect for the rule of law and the observance of human
rights, is quite distant from fulfilling these high standards.
Some of the main areas of concern in this respect are dealt with in
the next section. For now, it should be noted that during the recent
electoral campaign not only the opposition parties, but also the ruling
official party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional - P.R.I.) recognized
the deficiencies in the administration of justice as one of the most
important issues and offered wide sets of proposals to cope with the
problem. 5 The two proposals most representative of the views of the
electorate were included in the P.A.N.'s political platform:
DIAGNOSIS: ... ATROPHIC JUDICIAL POWER ... (26) The
Judicial Power of the Federation is not the third power described by
the Constitution. In a moment of Mexico when the reform of the
State is a central issue ... the Judicial Power shows a stubborn
resistance to assume any transformation which might be different to
its mere technification. There are confusions between autonomy and
isolation, between immobility and immobilism, and the gravest: a
gradual deterioration of its moral authority is perceived .... (27)
... It is necessary to guarantee the autonomy of the Federal Judicial
Power and at the same time to establish provisions in order to force
the judges to fulfill their constitutional duties .... (41) In Mexico
there is an increase in criminal activity, each time more violent and
organized .... Public insecurity is also growing .... (42) Insecurity
4. For a complete and accurate discussion of the right to enjoy a just order through the
jurisdiction under the Mexican Constitution, see JUVENTINO V. CASTRO, GARANTiAS Y AMPARO 180-
88 (4th ed. Porrfia Edition 1983) (Mex.).
5. Nine political parties contended in the 1994 federal election to renew both houses of Congress,
to replace the individual holding the Federal Executive Power and to renovate the Assembly of
Representatives of the Federal District: Partido Acci6n Nacional (P.A.N.), Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (P.R.I.), Partido de ]a Revoluci6n Democrdtica (P.R.D.), Partido del Trabajo (P.T.),
Partido Popular Socialista (P.P.S.), Partido Aut6ntico de la Revoluci6n Mexicana (P.A.R.M.),
Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucci6n Nacional (P.F.C.R.N.), Partido Verde Ecologista
Mexicano (P.V.E.M.), and Partido Dem6crata Mexicano (P.D.M.). According to the official results
of the August 21, 1994 election, only the P.A.N., the P.R.I. and the P.R.D. received substantial
percentages of the popular vote, i.e., 27%, 50% and 16%, respectively.
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is aggravated by corruption in the police bodies. The way in which
some members of these bodies grant protection to criminal organi-
zations is shocking .... (43) The procuration of justice is often
subject to political pressures which deprive it of the function of
assuring protection, under the law and without any discrimination,
to the goods and values which are most important for Mexicans.
This gives room for impunity, especially in the cases of some public
officers .... (48) Due to the absence of the rule of law, the Mexican
public administration is invaded by corruption .... 2. POSITION
•.. (64) It is essential for the effectiveness of the rule of law that
the Judicial Power be completely independent of the Legislative and
Executive branches, but responsible to the Nation. An independent
judiciary is the last safeguard for the rights of individuals ... (75)
The rule of law requires that the public powers guarantee to individuals
the administration of justice, the protection of their lives, health and
goods, as well as the safeguard of the public order .... (76) The
State must give special attention and assign enough resources to combat
criminal activity and organized crime .... 3. PROPOSALS. (106)
The autonomy of the Judicial Power shall be respected. Furthermore,
a General Judicial Council shall be created ... (107) New and more
stringent requirements to become a Supreme Court justice shall be
established . . . (109) An operative, administrative and organizational
modernization of the Judicial Branch of the Federation shall be
promoted ... .6
On the other hand, Ernesto Zedillo, presidential candidate of the official
party, P.R.I., stated: "We face urgent and grave tasks with respect to
justice and security," and he submitted his proposal "which seeks to
incorporate new instruments to rely on a more modern and efficient
system of justice," in ten points:
1. To achieve the professionalization, dignification and moralization
of the members of public security bodies... ;
2. To enhance the administration of public security...;
3. To make police coordination a reality... ;
4. To conduct a great campaign for crime prevention...
5. To fight against drug trafficking as well as to prevent and react
before abductions and other high-impact crimes... ;
6. To modernize the function of the Attorney General's office...
7. To modernize the system of justice ... ;
8. To ensure the independence of judges and quality in the admin-
istration of justice... ;
9. To guarantee access to justice for all... ; and
10. To establish effective mechanisms for the judicial review and
control of acts of the authorities.
Zedillo finished by saying: "Today, I ratify before the nation my will
to change. I adhere myself once again to the popular clamor for security,
and justice for the citizenship." '7
6. PARTIDo AccI6N NACIONAL, SECRETARIA NACIONAL DE ESTUDIOS, PLATAFORMA POLTICA 1994-
2000 at 3-12 (1994) (author's translation).
7. Ernesto Zedillo, Seguridad y Justicia Para la Ciudadanfa in EXAMEN, UNA PuaucAcI6N
DAk LA DEMOCRACiA 18-19 (Comit6 Ejecutivo Nacional del P.R.I. [P.R.I. National Executive
Committee] Aug. 1994) (author's translation).
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The political parties and their candidates are not the only voices that
have expressed concern for the pitiful state of the administration of justice
in Mexico. Intellectuals, scholars and practitioners have also joined the
popular outcry. In September 1994, two prominent lawyers and professors
of law at the National Autonomous University made important remarks
on the issue to an influential Mexico City newspaper. In one interview,
Dr. Raiil Carrancd y Rivas maintained that:
It]he fierce presidentialism has inhibited the Judicial Power to fulfill
its functions. The administration of justice has been impaired by the
Federal Executive's interference. Furthermore, with the amendments
and reforms to the Constitution and the laws promoted by that same
Executive, the powers of the Nation's Supreme Court of Justice have
been atomized .... Therefore, it is urgent to restore the Judicial
Power in all its force, in order for it to really be the highest organism
in the administration of justice .... Ernesto Zedillo, virtual President-
Elect, is under the obligation to honor, like a man and a citizen, the
compromise he acquired with the people: to respect and to fortify
the Judicial Power, through the obeyance of the constitutional pro-
visions and the avoidance of the trend to take powers which do not
pertain to him.'
Carrancd expressed the wish that Zedillo's statements on the issue "are
not a campaign promise only." 9 In turn, Dr. Jos6 Luis Soberanes declared
that "the administration of justice leaves much to be desired, and the
population has no confidence in it." 1 He demanded a profound and
integral reform of the Judicial Power, because in Mexico crime is not
punished, but poverty is."
The lack of confidence in the administration of justice is due to the
fact that the Mexican State does not fulfill its obligation to administer
justice in a prompt and expeditious manner because, among other
things, the Supreme Court is influenced by politics. Thus, it is urgent
to stop the interference the Federal Executive exercises over the Judicial
Branch ... the people will believe in justice again when it is clear
that changes in the Judicial Branch force those who administer justice
to act impartially. The public confidence will be restored, neither with
addresses nor with good intentions, but with tangible facts. 12
II. MAJOR PROBLEMS AND MAIN CONCERNS
A. Mexican Presidentialism and the Independence of
the Judicial Branch
Ever since that nation began its constitutional life as a free and
independent state, the fundamental laws of Mexico adopted the principle
8. Interview with Dr. Rafil Carrancd y Rivas, Professor Emeritus at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico, ii EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico City), Sept. 4, 1994, at 1, 24 (author's translation).
9. Id. (author's translation).
10. Interview with Dr. Jos6 Luis Soberanes, Director of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas
of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, in EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico City), Sept. 5, 1994,
at 1, 26-27 (author's translation).
11. Id.
12. Id. (author's translation).
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of "division of powers," as has been classically phrased by Locke and
Montesquieu. The Constitution presently in force, seventy-seven years
after its issuance, still recognizes division of powers as the cornerstone
of Mexico's political organization; however, it does not grant that principle
the rigid and absolute character of its original interpretation. Today it
is generally accepted that the necessary distribution of state functions
among the several branches of government implies, by itself, a reciprocal
control among the branches: a system of checks and balances which
additionally produces a coordination of the branches to act jointly and
in collaboration. There is no question, however, that each of the three
traditional branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial,
must be exempt of any subordination or dependency with respect to the
other branches.
It should be noted that within this Mexican constitutional framework,
the federal Judicial Power occupies a relevant place because the exercise
of the jurisdictional power primarily vested in it not only refers to the
resolution of conflicts, controversies and legal issues that arise in the
ordinary lives of the state and its citizens, but also to the interpretation
and defense of the Constitution at the highest level of authority.
Therefore, the federal judiciary becomes the interpreter and the guard
of the whole legal order. Its mission as supreme interpreter of the
Fundamental Law leads to the conclusion that the judicial branch is the
branch of government most tightly related to the observance and defense
of fundamental human rights, as well as to the protection and survival
of the constitutional system. To properly discharge these vital duties, the
judicial branch has to rely on its independence and autonomy from the
other government branches of the Mexican state. 3
The preceding theory, however, is no more than that, a theory. The
Mexican political system is a system of government that was originally
intended to be merely presidential, as opposed to parliamentary. However,
the system has developed into a presidentialist one: the chief executive
often acts outside of constitutional bounds in the exercise of certain
powers which supposedly have been conferred upon him by the political
system itself, rather than by the Fundamental Law.
In a very extensive and serious analysis of the Mexican presidentialism
phenomenon, Dr. Jorge Carpizo refers to such powers as "metaconsti-
tutional powers,"' i.e., powers which go beyond the limits of the powers
effectively granted by the Constitution. Such powers are, according to
Dr. Carpizo, (a) the ones which derive from being the real leader of the
official party, P.R.I., which include the appointment of that party's
candidates for the Federal Congress, the state governors and the mayors
13. For a brief but accurate discussion of the integration, powers and role of the federal Judicial
Power in Mexico, see Claudia Leticia Ortega Medina, Integracidn, prerrogativas y competencia del
Organo Judicial Federal, in 75 ANrVERSARTO DE LA CONsTucI6N POLiTICA DE LOS EsTADos UNIDOS
MEXaCANOS 367-91 (Porria Edition 1992) (Mex.) [hereinafter Ortega Medina]. For a more detailed
discussion, see Felipe Tena Ramirez, DERECHO CONsTrrociONAL MExiCANO 477-533 (20th ed. Porrfia
Edition 1984) (Mex.).
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of the principal municipalities; (b) the appointment of his successor in
the presidency; and (c) the appointment and removal of state governors. 4
Although Carpizo's analysis and discussion are valid and accurate, these
supposed powers should not be labeled as being "metaconstitutional,"
but instead as clearly "unconstitutional."
This hypertrophic enlargement of the powers of the Mexican presidency
led Daniel Cosio Villegas to maintain that Mexico is the only republic
in the world which is governed by an absolute monarch for six years,
"and the requirement that a person be a member of the revolutionary
family to become president leads the scurrilous commentator to refine
the foregoing definition by saying that it is a six-year absolute and
hereditary monarchy.' ' 5
It would certainly be interesting to discuss at length the historical
development of the judicial branch in Mexico and of its main organism,
the Supreme Court of Justice. However, this subject is too extensive to
be included in this presentation. 6 For now, it should only be noted that
"the independence of the judiciary has been a constant issue in Mexico's
history. With more or less good judgment, the diverse Constitutions have
established systems to guarantee such independence. There is the belief
that impartial justice is an indispensable value."'17
Again, it would appear that the problem is not one of absence of
provisions in the Constitution and the laws, but one of observance and
fulfillment of their mandates. Carrancd y Rivas charges that Mexican
presidentialism has impaired the independence of the judiciary. 8
It appears that a prestigious justice of the Supreme Court of Justice,
Mariano Azuela Giiitr6n, concurs with Carrancd's opinion. Recently,
Azuela declared that "the administration of justice in Mexico has been
disarranged by the interference of the Federal Executive, and because
the Supreme Court of Justice has been utilized as a 'political springboard'
by politicians who have been appointed to the Court as a transitory
position while seeking to satisfy their political ambitions in other posi-
tions." 9
It is necessary to insist and stress that independence of the judiciary
depends basically on the will of those who are its members. 2° Nevertheless,
14. JORGE CARPIZO, EL PRESIDENCIALISMO MEXICANO 121, 190-99 (Siglo XXI Edition 1978) (Mex.).
15. DANIEL COSfO VInLEGAS, EL SISTEMA POLITICO MEXiCANO 30-31 (Joaquin Mortiz Edition 1972)
(Mex.) (author's translation).
16. Complete discussions about this subject, which focus on the independence of the judiciary,
may be found in Elisur Arteaga N., La Independencia de la Rama Judicial, in DERECHo CoMPARADo
MtXico EsTADos UNmos 399 (James F. Smith ed., 1990) (Mex.) [hereinafter Arteaga], and in Hictor
Fix Zamudio, La Independencia Judicial en el Ordenamiento Mexicano, in DERECHO COMPARADO
Mtxico EsTADos UNmos 379-92 (James F. Smith ed., 1990) (Mex.). See also Rafael Estrada Sdnano,
La Independencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacin, 5 ANADE 23-34 (1992) (Mex.)
[hereinafter Estrada Shnano].
17. Arteaga, supra note 16.
18. See supra note 8.
19. Interview with Justice Mariano Azuela Giiitr6n, Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice,
in EL UNIVERsAL (Mexico City), Sept. 12, 1994, at 1, 24-25 (author's translation).
20. See Estrada Sdmano, supra note 16.
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many scholars and practitioners have proposed a series of measures and
constitutional amendments to avoid future lamentable experiences when
the federal judiciary shows lack of independence and even abdicates its
functions. An example of such an experience took place when President
Jos6 L6pez Portillo nationalized the banking system in 1982. To say the
least, the behavior of the federal courts in this important matter was
dismal. 21
Among the mechanisms and amendments that have been proposed to
assure the independence of the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court,
and to restore their prestige and make them fully assume their functions,
are the following: (a) to establish the judicial career; (b) to make a
qualified selection of federal judges, magistrates and justices; (c) to provide
them with adequate compensation, rewards and recognition, as well as
a decent retirement; (d) to make judicial officers non-removable from
office; and (e) to amend the procedure to appoint the justices of the
Supreme Court of Justice. Today, the procedure for appointing Supreme
Court justices is very similar to the one followed in the United States.
However, the advice and consent of the Mexican Senate is widely regarded
as a mere "rubber stamp" for those appointed by the Chief Executive.
Consequently, candidates for a justiceship are often politicians who once
attended law school, but who have either not practiced the legal profession
nor served as judges on the bench.
Azuela Giiitr6n has even proposed that individuals who accept and
serve a justiceship in the Supreme Court should be barred from accepting
any appointive or elected public office in the future. This would eliminate
the practice of using the Supreme Court as a political springboard or,
even worse, as a shelter for politicians who are temporarily in misfortune,
due to the continuously changing circumstances of politics. 22
B. The Lack of a Department of Justice
The revolutionary Constituent Assembly of Querdtaro, during its last
session January 29-31, 1917, approved the text of Transitory Article 14
of the new Federal Constitution without any precedent, without paying
much attention to the issues involved during the debate, and with a great
degree of haste. Transitory Article 14 prohibited, proscribed and extin-
guished the Department of Justice, a ministry that had existed in Mexico
since its independence from Spain. It must be acknowledged that there
is a great variety of services which the administration of justice implies
and requires, and which must be rendered by the executive branch rather
than by the judiciary. This is because the judicial branch must primarily,
21. See RAM6N SkAcHrz MEDAL, EL FRAUDE A iA CoNsTIrucI6N (Porrifa Edition 1988) (Mex.).
22. See Estrada Smano, supra note 16; RAm6N Sk'cHEz MEDAL, TEMAS JURiDICOS DE AcTUALIDAD
(1993) (Mex.); Efrain Gonzdlez Morfin, Reformas y Adiciones a la Constituticidn Jur(dica, 10
ANUARIO DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD IBEROAMERICANA 153 (1978) (Mex.);
MARIANO AZUELA Gf~rrR6N, EL DERECHO A LA JuIusDIccIN Y LA MODERNIDAD EN LA ADMINImTRACI6N
DE JusTicIA, EsTuDIos JURiDICOS EN HOMENAJE A MANUEL HEIRRRA Y LASso (1890-1990) 65-66
(1990) (Mex.).
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and almost exclusively, preoccupy itself with exercising the jurisdictional
power of the State.
After a very thorough investigation, 23 this author has concluded that
the Constituent Assembly's rationale for proscribing a ministry as im-
portant as the Department of Justice is not clear. A respected professor
of Mexican constitutional law, F. Jorge Gaxiola, guesses that such an
extreme measure was taken because during the long dictatorship of Porfirio
Diaz, the Department of Justice was used by the Executive Branch as
a channel to unduly influence judicial resolutions, thereby depriving
judges, magistrates and justices of their independence and autonomy.
However, Gaxiola's conclusion is not based either on historical fact nor
on the arguments discussed during the above-mentioned session of the
Quer~taro Assembly.
In any case, it is clear that since 1917 the Mexican public administration
has lacked a Department of Justice. It is also true that the functions
and services traditionally attributed to a Department of Justice were either
improperly allocated to the Department of the Interior and the Office
of the Attorney General or, worse yet, they were not assigned to any
governmental agency at all. The administration of justice has undoubtedly
suffered negative effects as a result.
In 1957, the influential journal Novedades conducted a survey on the
state of the administration of justice in Mexico. Distinguished jurists
expressed their opinions about the deficiencies in the federal and state
tribunals. One such jurist, Dr. Antonio Martinez Bdez, a conspicuous
Mexican scholar, opined that the grave backwardness so apparent in
Mexican justice was due to the circumstance "that in our political or-
ganization there does not exist an organism or institution charged with
the task of watching the administration of justice, not only pursuant to
legal provisions, but in accordance with ethical and moral imperatives.''24
Martinez Bdez concluded that the adequate remedy for such a situation
was "the immediate creation of an organism that should be responsible
for paying attention to the material, moral and technical problems which
affect Mexican justice today. Such an organism should act with due
respect for the absolute independence of the Judicial Power."' 2
This idea was later discussed in depth and adopted by the Barra
Mexicana, Cblegio de Abogados, a professional association. 26 During 1961
and 1963, the Barra organized a series of lectures, among them an extensive
essay by Martinez Bdez. Such lectures and studies were published by the
Barra de Abogados under the title "For a Department of Justice.''27
23. Rafael Estrada Stmano, Necesidad de Reinstaurar, dentro de la estructura del Poder Ejecutivo
Federal, la Secretaria de Justicia, 3 REvssr DE INVESTIGACIONES JuRiDiCAS 367-69 (1979) (Mex.).
24. Antonio Martinez Bdez, La Institucidn del Ministerio Pdblico y su cardcter de Representante
Social: Una revaloracidn, in LA PROCURACI6N DE JUS11CIA, PROBLEMAS, RETOS Y PERSPECnVAs 334
(Procuraduria General de la Reptiblica 1993) (Mex.) (author's translation).
25. Id. (author's translation). 1
26. Dr. Martinez Bdez was, and -still is, a respected member of this organization.
27. Barra Mexicana & Colegio de Abogados, Por una Secretarfa de Justicia, in EL FoRO (Mexico
City) (1963).
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By its own nature, Transitory Article 14 of the Constitution was intended
to pertain to temporary situations; it has resulted, however, in a very
permanent and persistent provision which subsists as a prohibition to
create a Department of Justice. Meanwhile, the very important functions
traditionally attributed to that department have not been discharged by
the Office of the Attorney General, even though the latter was styled
"Legal Counsel of the Federation" in a different constitutional provi-
sion-Article 102. There is no question about the harm that this careless
oversight has caused. A convenient and desirable development of many
-aspects related to the administration of justice in Mexico simply has not
been possible.
C. The Amparo Lawsuit and the "Otero Formula"
The system to control the constitutionality of acts performed by both
local and federal entities, which has been adopted by the Mexican Con-
stitution, is solely a judicial function. This is due not only to the nature
of the organ which is charged with such function, the federal judiciary,
but also because its exercise implies a sequence of acts of a judicial
character. As a result, a true jurisdictional proceeding takes place and
may result with the declaration of a law as being unconstitutional, or
of an act by any authority as being in violation of the fundamental
individual rights. Such a system has been shaped through "the most
important and fruitful legal institution in the nation's legal order and,
without any doubt, the only original and creative work made by Mexican
jurists: the amparo lawsuit. ' 28
Indeed, the amparo suit is a Mexican legal institution similar in its
effects to such Anglo-American procedures as habeas corpus, error and
other forms of injunctive relief. It has undergone a long evolution since
it was first incorporated in the State Constitution of Yucatdn in 1841
and then in the Federal Constitution of 1857. Today, its principal purpose
is to protect private individuals in the enjoyment of rights granted to
them by the first twenty-nine articles of the Constitution, commonly
known as "Individual Guarantees." 29
It should be noted that the amparo lawsuit has evolved into a highly
complex institution performing three functions: the defense and protection
of the "Individual Guarantees," the determination of the constitutionality
of federal and state legislation, and cessation.
The second of these functions deserves special treatment for purposes
of this article. With respect to its effects, the amparo resolution affects
only the parties who have intervened in the procedure and pertains solely
to the specific case that has been brought before the federal judiciary.
This is the constitutional principle known as "relativity of the amparo
28. Alfonso Noriega Cantfi, El Juicio de Amparo, in Obra Jur(dica Mexicana, 2 PROCURADURiA
GENERAL DE LA REPBLICA 1562 (1985) (Mex.).
29. For a thorough and well documented study of the amparo in English, see RICHARD D.
BAKER, JUDICIAL Rvisw IN Mfxico, A STUDY OF THE "AmPARO" SUIT (1971).
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resolutions." This principle derives from the "Otero formula," so des-
ignated because it was conceived in 1847 by Mariano Otero, one of the
creators of the amparo lawsuit, when he proposed the adoption of this
constitutional procedure.
The Otero formula and the principle of relativity of the amparo re-
solutions acquire great importance with respect to the amparo complaints
which are brought to challenge the constitutionality of a given law. A
declaration of unconstitutionality issued by the federal judiciary does not
have the effect of repealing the law erga omnes. It does not generate
the obligation of the legislative body to repeal the unconstitutional law.
Its effects are limited to establishing that the law declared unconstitutional
shall not apply to the specific case and with respect to the parties involved
in the amparo action. Therefore, as Dr. Juventino V. Castro has pointed
out, "there is no such thing as amparo against unconstitutional laws;
there is only amparo against the application of such laws to a specific
case which has been raised by an individual who has been diligent enough
to request it from the Federal Judiciary." 30 Dr. Castro has conducted
perhaps the most complete research work on the Otero formula. He
concludes that it was only partially adopted and that, therefore, it is
historically inaccurate and unfair to blame Mariano Otero for the ap-
plication of the principle of relativity of the amparo sentence to cases
where a Congressional law is declared unconstitutional.31 Based on strong
reason and on impeccable logic, Castro concludes-and this has been his
position since long ago-that the effects of the amparo resolution should
be the annulment and repeal of such law erga omnes.32 He supports his
assertion in the following quote by the famous Italian Professor Cala-
mandrei: "A system may not be deemed a civilized order when the free
application of discredited laws is accepted." '33
Other authors also maintain that the principle which derives from the
Otero formula requires a revision. Antonio Carrillo Flores stated that
the Otero formula has already met its objectives. Therefore, he proposed
that:
the amparo resolutions condemning a law as unconstitutional have
effects not only for the specific case, but for any other case. Perhaps,
as I have dared to propose, a realistic and intermediate formula would
be that such resolutions notify the respective Congress, either Federal
or State, so that the latter would proceed to repeal the law or to
modify it and adjust it to the terms of the Supreme Court of Justice's
resolution. 34
30. JUVENTINO V. CASTRO, HACiA EL AmPA'o EvoLucIONADo 42 (Porrda Edition 1971) (Mex.)
(author's translation).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 44 (author's translation).
34. ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES, LA CONsTrrucI6N, LA SUPREMA CORTE Y LOS DERECHos HuMANos
32-33 (Porra Edition 1981) (Mex.) (author's translation).
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Hector Fix Zamudio also shares the idea of extending the traditional
Otero formula in order to
adopt the contrary principle, i.e., to establish the "erga omnes" effects
of the Supreme Court's findings of unconstitutionality of legislative
provisions, as it has been accepted, gradually but inexorably, not only
through the European constitutional tribunals of the Austrian type,
but also throughout Latin America .... 1
In accordance with the Constitutional principle of collaboration among
the branches of government, to attribute general or erga omnes effects
to a judicial decision declaring a legal provision unconstitutional would
not necessarily constitute an intromission by the judicial branch into the
legislative function: the judiciary would still be powerless to initiate bills
or laws. More precisely, it would enhance collaboration among the two
branches in seeking the improvement of the legal order, and its devel-
opment within the constitutional framework.
On the other hand, the amparo lawsuit's objectives are to defend and
protect the enjoyment of the "Individual Guarantees" and, in general,
to control the constitutionality of acts of the authorities. These two
objectives are poorly served if the effects of the amparo resolution continue
to be confined to the specific case and to the individual who sought the
constitutional protection, especially if the subject matter involved is a
law, by definition an order or mandate with general and abstract effects.3 6
Finally, in a very recent editorial entitled Light and Shadow in Justice,
Dr. Sergio Garcia Ramirez lists twenty-two concerns regarding the ad-
ministration of justice in Mexico .3 Listed under No. 12 is a reference
to the Otero formula. With a high degree of resemblance to Carrillo
Flores' opinion, Garcfa Ramirez states that:
the Otero formula avoided collisions among the Powers: conflicts
between the Legislative Power which enacts a law, or the Executive
Power which issues a set of regulations, and the Judicial Power that
deems such provisions unconstitutional. This has allowed the devel-
opment of the Mexican Amparo. However, the hour has come-
perhaps it came long ago-to revise that formula or to find progressive
solutions for the sake of justice. One of these solutions may be the
official communication by the Attorney General's Office3 to Congress
of the ruling declaring the unconstitutionality of the law and with a
legal opinion by the Attorney General, so that the legislature revises
its own act, if that be the case. Thus, each government branch would
fulfill its natural attributes and the danger of a conflict would be
reduced.39
35. Hdctor Fix Zamudio, Los Tribunales Federales como Controladores de la Constitucidn, in
TEMAS Y PROBLEMAS DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA EN MAxIxCO 163 (Porrgia Edition 1985)
(Mex.) (author's translation).
36. See also Ortega Medina, supra note 13, at 386.
37. Editorial by Sergio Garcia Ramirez in ExcgLSIOR (Mexico City), Aug. 4, 1994, at 1, 10, 15
[hereinafter Garcia Ramirez].
38. Or through the Department of Justice, should it be reinstated.
39. Garcia Ramfrez, supra note 37, at 10.
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As stated before, the Mexican amparo lawsuit has undergone a long
evolution that has required a considerable effort from jurists, practitioners
and members of the judiciary. It would be a pity to stop this evolution;
moreover, it would be a serious mistake and a disservice to justice.
This study has been an attempt to deal in depth with three of the
major areas of concern with respect to the administration of justice in
Mexico. However, it should be noted that there is a long list of other
problems and concerns. It would be impossible to deal with all of them
in the same depth; therefore, it appears that short mention of other
issues is in order.
D. Slowness and Tardiness
It is often stated that delay in the administration of justice is equivalent
to a denial of justice. If this is so, then Mexico is plagued with denials
of justice. An excessive formalism in the proceedings, indolence on the
part of judges and judicial officers, and the activities of certain litigious
lawyers who are used to taking advantage of the sluggishness in the
administration of justice are the main causes for this situation.
More than a matter of amendments to the procedural laws to reduce
or eliminate terms, what is truly necessary is to create a new "type of
proceedings," 4 which offer celerity and at the same time observe the
essence of due process of law. It is true that this has been attempted
several times without success. In fact, the amendments and reforms have
at times represented more of a backwards motion than a progressive one.
From a practical standpoint, there is a great deal to do on this issue in
all areas of the law.
E. Proliferation of Specialized Agencies and Tribunals
Perhaps with the intention of coping with some of the deficiencies of
the ordinary jurisdiction, there has been a trend in Mexico to create
parajudicial agencies within the Executive Power or specialized tribunals.
In these entities conciliation between the parties is normally mandatory,
prior to the moment when the litigation phase properly takes place. In
many instances, like in the case of the Federal Consumer Protection
Agency (Procuradurfa Federal del Consumidor), this measure has produced
good results, both from the viewpoint of prompt solution of controversies
and because it has diminished the workload in the ordinary tribunals.
Among these newly created bodies, one governmental organization
deserves special mention. The National Human Rights Commission (Com-
isidn Nacional de Derechos Humanos) was created in 1989 by decree of
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to receive the complaints of Mexican
citizens or inhabitants who believe their human rights have been violated
by a governmental authority or public servant. Although these types of
40. Id. at 15.
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violations could be relieved by resorting to an amparo lawsuit, the excessive
formalities, the complexity and the difficulty in obtaining a quick res-
olution in an amparo have caused popular recourse to the Human Rights
Commission. When a complaint is filed, the Commission secures infor-
mation and evidence, and ultimately issues a recommendation to the
authority or public servant involved in the complaint. Such recommen-
dations are public, autonomous and non-mandatory; however, if a criminal
offense is involved, the Commission may proceed to file the corresponding
accusation before the Office of the Attorney General.
It should be noted that after its creation, it was soon realized that
the Commission lacked a constitutional entity. Therefore, the Federal
Constitution was amended by Paragraph B in Article 102 which regulates
the existence of the Commission and the similar commissions organized
in each state by the local governments.
Other parajudicial agencies or specialized tribunals which have recently
been created by the federal government are (1) the Economic Competence
Commission (Comisidn de Competencia Econdmica), which deals with
antitrust matters (curiously enough a very recent area of the law in
Mexico resulting mainly from Mexico's entrance into the global market,
specifically through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA));41
(2) the Superior Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Agrario), which
was created as a result of the amendments introduced in Article 27 of
the Constitution to cope with problems related to property and exploitation
of agrarian lands; and (3) the Federal Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Federal
Electoral), organized to resolve controversies between the political parties
and their candidates, on the one hand, and the electoral authorities, on
the other, that arise from contested elections.
To these recently created entities, others that were organized years ago
should be added: the National Banking Commission (Comisidn Nacional
Bancaria); the Labor Tribunals (Juntas de Conciliacidn y Arbitraje); and
the Federal Tax Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal de la Federaci6n). All of these
agencies follow the tendency to create specialized bodies or entities for
the solution of controversies. It should be noted that each entity is subject
to judicial review and constitutional control through the amparo lawsuit,
with the sole exception of the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which has the
power to issue final and definitive resolutions.
F. The Role of Arbitration
The use of arbitration as an alternative instrument to solve controversies
and thereby administer justice in private matters has been acknowledged
by Mexican law for many years, but has rarely been used.
In the commercial arbitration context, a separate provision on arbi-
tration was included in the Commercial Code up until 1989. It is patterned
after international commercial arbitration rules and is expected to foster
41. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R. Doc. No.
103-159 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
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recourse to arbitration among merchants and commercial companies. The
international trade agreements or treaties to which Mexico has entered
as a party, such as NAFTA, will also enhance the use of international
commercial arbitration, as will the creation of multinational entities to
solve controversies that may arise between the NAFTA nations, or between
citizens of these countries and the government of a different member
nation.
G. The Attorney General's Office (Ministerio Piblico) and the
Prosecution of Criminal Offenses
This is an area where a complete treatise would likely not be enough
to deal with all the intricate problems posed by a very deficient and
corrupt system for the prosecution of criminal offenses. Practitioners and
scholars, as well as political parties and, in some instances, even gov-
ernment authorities, accept that in Mexico criminality and organized crime
are increasing, each time with more violence and belligerency. Public
insecurity is growing, aggravated by corruption in the police bodies. The
protection that some members of the police bodies give to criminal
organizations is especially scandalous. 42
Professionalization of the police organizations and of the offices of
the attorneys general (Ministerios Pdblicos) has not been achieved. For
one, there is a lack of scientific bodies for the investigation and prosecution
of criminal offenses. Second, there is no civil service career in the public
security agencies. Finally, in order to achieve professionalization, it is
urgent to foster an ethical education in the different police academies.
Notwithstanding express limitations and prohibitions in the Constitution,
several police organizations have proliferated on the federal level. These
bodies duplicate each other's functions and propitiate out-of-control police
actions. As a result, insecurity for the common citizen has flourished.
The prosecution of crime is often subject to pressures of a political
character which deprive it of the high function of protecting, in accordance
with the law and without any discrimination, the most important goods
and values of the Mexican community. The current situation allows for
the exercise of authority with impunity, especially in the case of some
high public officers.
In sum, very profound and effective reform is urgently needed in this
area, in accordance with the writings, proposals and requirements of
scholars, law professors, political leaders, intellectuals and journalists. It
can be said without hesitation that less talk, less -ink, and much more
effective facts and deeds on this very sensitive issue are badly needed in
Mexico, a country otherwise so beautiful, so colorful, so hospitable, and
so friendly.
42. Garcia Ramirez, supra note 37.
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